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REMEDIES-PRIVATE NUISANCE-
COMPARATIVE INJURY DOCTRINE IN WEST
VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION
"There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire
law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance'."' One cer-
tainty, however, is that every successful nuisance action involves
two central issues.2 First, there must be a judicial determination
that there is in fact a nuisance,3 and secondly, the court must
decide whether the appropriate remedy is damages or injunctive
relief.4 The first issue is largely a factual determination.' This note
is directed toward remedies. In particular, it is directed toward the
factors that are given primary consideration in deciding whether a
permanent injunction against a business enterprise by a private
individual will be granted.
Increasingly, modem nuisance litigation has involved a bal-
ancing of conflicting interests between business establishments
and private residences.' Representative of this conflict is a Massa-
chusetts case that determined that the operation of a piggery
would be enjoined where it could hardly be contended that dam-
ages alone were adequate compensation for the affront to the sen-
ses of homeowners and their families from the nauseating odors.7
Noting that it would be a costly and inconvenient process to move
the business, the court determined an injunction to be the only
way to avoid the unpleasantness and insure the day to day comfort
of the neighboring residents.8 None would seriously challenge the
homeowner's legal right to use and enjoy his property. Further-
more, each homeowner has an interest in protecting his investment
I W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 86 (4th ed. 1971).
2 W. PRossER, supra note 1, at § 90; Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d 692, 699
(W. Va. 1974).
3 205 S.E.2d at 699.
4Id.
5 The question of whether an alleged nuisance is in fact a nuisance is not within
the scope of this note. Also not discussed is the body of law governing public
nuisance actions. For a discussion of public nuisance see, Rothstein, Private Ac-
tions for Public Nuisance: The Standing Problem, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 453 (1974).
1 This issue was squarely before the court in Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d
692 (W. Va. 1974).
Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963).
Id. at 312, 187 N.E.2d at 145.
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and in preventing its market value from declining The West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recently recognized that ordi-
narily habitation rights are superior to the rights of business."°
Additionally, the individual has certain intangible rights such as
the right to be free from excessive noise," light,"2 unsightliness, 3
or harmful forms of pollution."
When these interests are asserted against established busi-
nesses, the impact can be significant. In one case where a cement
company was throwing clouds of dust upon adjacent property and
the investment was $800,000 with five hundred men on the pay
roll, the court issued an injunction to curtail production after pri-
vate landowners alleged damage to their citrus trees and surround-
ing property. 5 In another case, defendant's one million dollar plant
employing four to five hundred people was closed down by the
court because -it did one hundred dollars annual damage to the
homeowners' property." The impact of an injunction upon the
community can also be significant. Injunctions of this type may
cause disadvantages by discouraging desirable businesses from lo-
cating in such an area, thereby effectively destroying any possible
growth potential. Given such possible adverse consequences, the
205 S.E.2d at 697.
,o Id. at 698.
" Ritz v. Woman's Club, 114 W. Va. 675, 173 S.E. 564 (1934).
12 Martin v. Williams, 141 W. Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835 (1956)
' Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368
(1937).
" Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
'5 Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
I' Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913). The
principle applied in this case was overruled by the court in Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). In Boomer,
the issue before the court was whether to enjoin the operation of a cement plant
that employed over three hundred people and represented a $45,000,000 investment
because it polluted farms and caused $185,000 in permanent damage. If the court
had followed the Whalen decision, the injunction would have been granted, how-
ever, the court chose to allow the plant to continue operating. The court granted
the injunction conditioned on the payment of permanent damages to the plaintiffs
that would compensate them for the total economic loss to their property caused
by the plant's operations. In essence, Boomer applied the doctrine of "disparity of
economic consequences" which states that permanent damages are allowed where
the loss recoverable would obviously be small as compared with the cost of removal
of the nuisance. Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling, 264 Ky. 470, 477, 95 S.W.2d
1, 5 (1936).
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approach and legal justification for any course of action taken by
a court is of critical importance.
II. FORMER PRACTICE
At one time the clear majority rule was that the courts would
not balance the conflicting interests involved. The rule was more
specifically stated: "[1]f the nuisance is clearly established, and
it appears that it is causing substantial, material, and irreparable
injury to the complainant, for which there is no adequate remedy
at law . . . the complainant is entitled to relief by injunction ir-
respective of the resulting damage to defendants."17 This rule ac-
counted for some of the harsh decisions reached by courts in many
cases;"8 however the policy supporting this doctrine continues to be
sound today. As was indicated in one case, "[E]very substantial,
material right of person or property is entitled to protection against
all the world. . . .If the smaller interest must yield to the larger,
all small property rights . . . and pursuits would sooner or later
be absorbed by the larger, more powerful few . . .,,"
To avoid the harsh effects of such an absolute rule, many
exceptions were developed. If the injury complained of was slight
or trivial, the injunction would not be granted." The "trivial"
exception was not really an exception, however, because the gen-
eral rule recognized that the harm complained of had to be "sub-
stantial" and "material."'" Nonetheless, slight or trivial injury
meant that the injury itself was slight, not that it was slight as
compared with the injury to the defendant." Additionally, a mi-
nority of cases recognized the exception that if a business was
located in a business area and the nuisance complained of was one
that naturally flowed from that type of business, the right to an
injunction was not absolute but rested in the sound discretion of
11 Rowland v. New York Stable Manure Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 168, 176-77, 101 A.
521, 525 (Ch. 1917).
11 E.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913);
Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911); Sullivan
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065 (1904).
11 Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 251, 118 P. 928,
933 (1911), quoting Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753,
807 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
10 State ex rel. Hopkins v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 259 Mo. 254, 169 S.W.
267 (1914); Gray v. Manhattan Ry., 128 N.Y. 499, 28 N.E. 498 (1891).
21 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
2 Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 5, 101 N.E. 805, 806 (1913);
See also Annot., 61 A.L.R. 924 (1929)
[Vol. 77
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the court.? The majority, however, failed to recognize this excep-
tion, holding that habitation rights were superior to business rights
whenever they conflict.? Also, the majority would not recognize
the exception that when public convenience was involved, an in-
junction would not issue as a matter of right.?
The "absolute rule," that once a substantial harm was proven
by the plaintiff stemming from a private nuisance, an injunction
would issue as a matter of right, was never part of the West Vir-
ginia law. As early as 1891 the court, in Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig
Furniture Co., stated that to enjoin a nuisance was not a matter
of strict right, but of reasonable discretion.26 This rule has been
consistently followed, and as late as 1969 the West Virginia court
reiterated the discretionary rule.?
2 Monlezun v. Jahncke Dry-Docks, Inc., 163 La. 400, 111 So. 886 (1927); Oliver
v. Forney Cotton Oil & Ginning Co., 226 S.W. 1094 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
24 Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn. 374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919).
2 E.g., Peterson v. Santa Rosa, 119 Cal. 387, 51 P. 557 (1897); Bowman v.
Humphrey, 124 Iowa 744, 100 N.W. 854 (1904).
" 34 W. Va. 804, 811, 12 S.E. 1085, 1087 (1891):
For although a court of equity in such cases follows precedent, and goes
by rule, as far as it can, yet it follows its own rules-and among them is
the one that to abate or restrain in case of nuisance is not a matter of
strict right, but of orderly and reasonable discretion, according to the
right of the particular case-and hence will refuse relief, and send the
party to a court of law, when damages would be a fairer approximation
to common justice, because to silence a useful and costly factory is often
a matter of serious moment to the state and town, as well as to the owner.
21 Severt v. Beckley Coals, Inc., 153 W. Va. 600, 170 S.E.2d 577 (1969). In West
Virginia, as in most other jurisdictions, the law of private nuisance remedies has
not been clearly stated and has frequently varied with changing social pressures.
Injunctive relief in nuisance actions was guided initially by the general law of
injunction, with the basic principles of injunction still normally applicable to mod-
em nuisance actions. Pointing out the general law of injunction in West Virginia,
the court in State ex rel. Donley v. Baker, 112 W. Va. 263, 164 S.E. 154 (1932),
stated that "[tihe granting or refusal of injunction . . . calls for the exercise of
sound judicial discretion in view of all the circumstances of the particular case;
regard being had to the nature of the controversy, the object for which the injunc-
tion is being sought, and the comparative hardship or convenience to the respective
parties involved . . . ." Id. at 263, 164 S.E. at 154 (emphasis added). Obviously,
the nature of the controversy can refer to nuisance actions, with the case dictating
the exercise of discretion to be partially focused upon this aspect. Similarly, the
object can be the permanent elimination of particular noise, pollution, excess light,
odors, and other possible nuisances and discretion is to be utilized in this respect.
Furthermore, Donley impliedly directs the court in nuisance actions, whose object
is the permanent elimination of some item, to base its decision upon the compara-
tive hardships and convenience of the parties.
4
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LI. CURRENT PRACTICE
Although the "absolute rule" was undoubtedly the majority
position forty years ago,M courts have recently adopted what is
frequently referred to as the doctrine of comparative injury. 29 Al-
though stated differently by many courts, the doctrine states that
the relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if the injunc-
tion is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied is one of the factors
to be considered in determining the appropriateness of an injunc-
tion. 0 The United States Supreme Court has stated that whether
a court of equity will restrain the acts complained of must depend
upon a variety of circumstances, including the comparative injury
from granting or refusing the injunction.3' The policy justification
for the doctrine was stated by one court: "[I]n a case of conflicting
rights. . . the law must make the best arrangement it can between
the contending parties with a view to preserving to each one the
largest measure of liberty possible under the circumstances."32
While all jurisdictions have not adopted this rule, a large ma-
jority of courts balance the interests of each party in a nuisance
action.3 Although not mentioned by name, the West Virginia court
in Powell applied the doctrine and refused injunctive relief to the
plaintiff, stating that "damages would be a fairer approximation
to common justice, because to silence a useful and costly factory
is often a matter of serious moment to the state and town, as well
as to the owner." The first West Virginia case to refer to the
1S Rowland v. New York Stable Manure Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 168, 101 A. 521 (Ch.
1917). See the cases collected in Annot., 61 A.L.R. 924 (1929).
2 The RESTATEmENT OF ToRs § 941 (1936) refers to this doctrine as the "bal-
ancing of hardships." Other terms applying to the same rule are the "balance of
injury," "comparative hardship," "balance of convenience," "balance of interests,"
or doctrine of "social utility." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS does not discuss this
matter. See Gunther v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 157 F. Supp. 25 (N.D.W.
Va. 1957); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 601 (1971). The term "doctrine of comparative
injury" will describe the concept in this note.
11 RESTATEMENT OF ToR § 941 (1936).
11 Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 56 (1913).
3 Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 367, 83
S.W. 658, 667 (1904).
33 See, e.g., Brown v. Allied Steel Prods. Corp., 273 Ala. 184, 136 So. 2d 923
(1962); Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
But see Gerrish v. Wishbone Farm, Inc., 108 N.H. 237, 231 A.2d 622 (1967); Crushed
Stone Co. v. Moore, 369 P.2d 811 (Okla. 1962).
3, Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 811, 12 S.E. 1085,
1087 (1891). The approach used by the court in Powell is remarkably similar to that
[Vol. 77
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comparative injury doctrine by name and to require its application
was State ex rel. Donley v. Baker" in 1932. Notwithstanding the
applications and announcements of the doctrine, the law in West
Virginia went through a period of uncertainty on the issue. The
doctrine was first confused in Ritz v. Womans Club."5 The defen-
dant, because of a large investment in a club that was declared a
private nuisance because it held late night dances in a residential
area, asked the court to apply the "comparative injury doctrine"
and refuse the injunction. In reply, the court stated that the weight
of authority was against a balancing of injury and that even where
it is recognized, it is applied with "great caution" and there can
be no "balancing of conveniences when such balancing involves the
preservation of an established right."37 The exact meaning of this
series of statements is not clear, but surely the court did not intend
a wholesale abandonment of the doctrine. In a syllabus point writ-
ten by the court, it was stated, "In cases of nuisance the 'compara-
tive injury' doctrine should be applied with great caution. The
doctrine must yield ordinarily to established property rights."
More probably, the doctrine was not rejected but was clearly re-
stricted by the "great caution" limitation, so as to not allow defen-
dants to easily escape the remedy of injunction. Another case,
Board of Commissioners v. Elm Grove Mining Co., reiterated the
"great caution" limitation to the application of the "comparative
injury" doctrine. 9 In addition to approving the "great caution"
limitation, the court narrowed the application of the doctrine by
holding that there was an extremely narrow basis for undertaking
to balance conveniences when people's health was involved.,' The
taken by the New York court in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,
257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), discussed in note 16 supra. The West
Virginia court also used a balancing approach in determining whether a nuisance
existed. For example, in Brokaw v. Carson, 74 W. Va. 340, 81 S.E. 1133 (1914), the
court said it was proper to consider the expense and inconvenience to the defendant
to move and to compare their trouble and expense with the annoyance and inconve-
nience to plaintiff in determining nuisance.
112 W. Va. 263, 164 S.E. 154 (1932).
114 W. Va. 675, 173 S.E. 564 (1934).
Id. at 678, 173 S.E. at 565.
s' Id. at 675, 173 S.E. at 564 (emphasis added).
' 122 W. Va. 442, 452, 9 S.E.2d 813, 817 (1940).
o Id. at 452, 9 S.E.2d at 817. The health hazard in Elm Grove was a burning
pile of gob or refuse material produced as a by-product of the defendant's mining
operation. The substance of the testimony at the trial was that within a radius of
more than a mile of the gob pile, the atmosphere was pungent with the odor of
burning sulphur and that the gases given off caused a burning sensation to the nose,
6
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impact of this decision is hard to gauge since Elm Grove was a
public nuisance action, not a private nuisance action."1 This con-
stant chipping away at the comparative injury doctrine could lead
some to believe that it was being disapproved. Additional confu-
sion was created by the decision in Hark v. Mt. Fork Lumber Co.
where the court stated, "[N]or is the expense and great inconve-
nience to defendant grounds for application of that theory." 2 Fur-
thermore, the court left unclear the exact status of the doctrine by
quoting other broad statements of rejection and citing cases that
had refused to accept the comparative injury doctrine. 3 However,
Hark did not involve a nuisance, but rather a trespass, and can be
distinguished on that basis." Notwithstanding the uncertainty the
three cases have caused, the court recently recognized the compar-
ative injury doctrine and ignored the confusion. 5 The recent state-
ment of the doctrine should settle the issue, making it clear that
West Virginia will apply the comparative injury doctrine. 6
throat, eyes, and respiratory tract with resultant irritation causing headache,
coughing, loss of appetite, and sleeplessness. Id. at 445, 9 S.E.2d at 815.
"1 Since the West Virginia court in Powell has recognized that the public inter-
est is a principle deserving appropriate attention in the balancing process in a
private nuisance action, 34 W. Va. 804, 12 S.E. 1085 (1891), there seems to be no
logical reason why Elm Grove should not apply with equal force to private nuisance
actions, notwithstanding the fact the case itself involved a public nuisance.
42 127 W. Va. 586, 597, 34 S.E.2d 348, 354-55 (1945).
For example, the court stated, "Once it is ascertained that a person has
established property rights which he seeks to protect by injunction, he will not
ordinarily be deprived of that remedy on the ground that the injunction operates
to the inconvenience of the person against whom the remedy is invoked. . . ... Id.
The court cited for support of this statement Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065 (1904), a case that followed the "absolute rule" and
would not balance the hardships. The court also cited Whalen v. Union Bag &
Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913), in which the New York court rejected
the balancing of comparative injury and closed a one million dollar factory.
41 Clearly trespass and nuisance involve different types of actions, but the
difference in application of equitable principles is not that significant. In fact, just
as courts will balance the hardships in nuisance cases, they will also balance them
in trespass cases. D. DoBas, HANDHOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEMS § 5.6 (1973).
0 Severt v. Beckley Coals, Inc., 153 W. Va. 600, 170 S.E.2d 577 (1969). See also
Gunther v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 157 F. Supp. 25, 33 (N.D.W. Va. 1957),
in which the court stated that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has
applied the doctrine in several cases.
11 Essentially the court in Severt v. Beckley Coals, Inc., 153 W. Va. 600, 170
S.E.2d 577 (1969), indicated there was no absolute right to injunctive relief in the
absence of a statute. To support this statement of law the court cited point four of
the syllabus in State ex rel. Donley v. Baker, 112 W. Va. 263, 164 S.E. 154 (1932).
See also note 27 supra. By its use of the Donley statement the court in Severt
[Vol. 77
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IV. IMPORTANT FAcTORS
Assuming that courts will balance conflicting interests, it is
necessary to determine those factors that are important in the
balancing process. Although some factors are of varying effective-
ness in different contexts, others are important in virtually every
case.
The principle that is determinative of more cases than any
other is the adequacy of a remedy at law. The adequacy of a rem-
edy at law, which in most nuisance cases means damages, is of
crucial importance in at least two areas of nuisance remedy. The
first area involves the traditional view that equitable relief will not
lie unless plaintiff's remedy at law is inadequate.47 There is no
general rule for determining when a legal remedy is inadequate,
but certain guidelines and standards have emerged." In the case
of nuisance the injunctive remedy in equity is almost always supe-
rior to damages, because the plaintiff has suffered diminished use
and enjoyment of his land which cannot be fully compensated by
damages." Thus, when there is little hardship on the defendant in
granting the injunction, and the only issue is adequacy of a remedy
at law, the nuisance will be enjoined.5 If damages alone are ade-
quate relief from the nuisance, injunctive relief will not be consid-
ered and damages will be awarded.51
evidently indicated that in an appropriate case the comparative injury doctrine
would be applied.
,T D. DOBBS, supra note 44, § 2.5, at 57.
4' Id. § 2.5, at 57-58. The legal remedy is usually inadequate and the equitable
remedy is usually granted when damages will not suffice because the plaintiff needs
the thing itself, e.g., peace and quiet, or because damages at law would be adequate
but cannot be measured with any reasonable degree of accuracy, e.g., damage from
excessive light or noise.
'o Id. § 2.5, at 59.
" Muehlman v. Keilman, 257 Ind. 100, 272 N.E.2d 591 (1971). The court stated
that if plaintiff can show great damage and no adequate remedy at law, he is
entitled to injunctive relief. The defendant's interference with plaintiff's comforta-
ble enjoyment of his property constituted great damage. Such matters as good
health and enjoyment of one's property transcend material wealth and defy at-
tempts to affix a price tag to them.
"1 Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1970).
See also Haack v. Lindsay Light & Chem. Co., 393 Ill. 367, 66 N.E.2d 391 (1946),
wherein the court indicated that if the damages are of a nature that cannot ade-
quately be compensated in a suit at law, equity will afford relief by injunction. And
conversely, an injunction may not be granted to abate the nuisance if redress may
be obtained in a court of law.
8
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Apparently this is the view taken in West Virginia. In Severt
v. Beckley Coals, Inc.,2 the court held that the plaintiffs had a full,
complete, and adequate remedy at law and, therefore, equity did
not have jurisdiction of the case. This conclusion was reached de-
spite the intangible aspects in the case incapable of direct mea-
surement. For example, according to uncontroverted testimony,
the defendant coal company began operations within sixty feet of
plaintiffs' property and 120 feet of their home with the installation
of an exhaust fan, crusher, belt carrier, and transport trucks, all
of which operated from six o'clock in the morning until two o'clock
in the morning the following day. The plaintiffs complained of
such intangibles as loud and disturbing noise that disrupted rest
and sleep and disturbed peace and comfort, and dust on the prop-
erty that prevented the usual use and enjoyment of the yard. In
light of this, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had a remedy
at law for reduced property value. 3
The second area of nuisance remedy involving damages oper-
ates when the remedy at law is clearly inadequate, but denys in-
junctive relief because the hardship on the defendant outweighs
the benefit to the plaintiff. During this process, numerous factors
are considered. One of these-the amount of redress that can be
afforded by the payment of money-is material to a decision
whether an injunction should be granted. Thus, in cases where an
injunction is sought and the granting of that injunction would
impose hardship upon the defendant business, in addition to in-
convenience and hardship upon the public, the fact that substan-
tial, if not total, redress is possible by an award of damages will
be a sufficient basis to deny the injunction against the business."
Even in cases where there is no adequate remedy at law, if the
52 153 W. Va. 600, 170 S.E.2d 577 (1969).
"Id. at 606, 170 S.E.2d at 581.
" Daigle v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 875, 883 (W.D. La. 1967). See
also Conner v. Smith, 433 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). West Virginia would
probably follow this approach as was done in Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furniture
Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 12 S.E. 1085 (1891), but there is some doubt because this could
have easily and appropriately been done in Severt v. Beckley Coals, Inc., 153 W.
Va. 600, 170 S.E.2d 577 (1969), but was not. In Severt, the court concluded damages
were adequate, but this seemed inappropriate because of the intangible harm done
to the plaintiff. The better approach would have been to have found damges inade-
quate but, because of the amount of redress possible by damages, to deny injunctive
relief.
[Vol. 77
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hardship upon the defendant and public is compelling, the injunc-
tion will be denied. 55
The public interest is another factor wisely considered by
courts trying to resolve conflicting interests in private nuisance
cases. Often when an injunction is granted, individuals not parties
to the suit will be affected adversely. Some authorities group the
rights of third parties not parties to the action within the concept
of public interest." Although this factor could theoretically benefit
either the plaintiff or the defendant in a proper case, the public
interest is usually reflected in jobs supplied, taxes paid, and serv-
ices performed by a business enterprise, and, therefore, considera-
tion of the public interest usually supports the business position
in defeating the injunction. For example, in one case the court
refused to enjoin a rendering plant that processed dead animals
and residue from slaughter houses, saying in effect that the render-
ing plant was the only one in the county and that it promoted
better sanitary conditions for 75,000 people, even though it was an
inconvenience and hardship on those who lived nearby."7
The West Virginia court will also consider the interest of the
public in an application of the comparative injury doctrine, even
though there is some uncertainty regarding this principle. In
Powell the court noted that the silencing of a costly factory could
have a serious impact upon the State and town.8 Nevertheless the
vagueness began to grow in Ritz, in which the club owner con-
tended the club served a valuable function to the public." The
court rejected the argument by bluntly stating that it was mani-
55 Johnson v. Independent School Dist., 239 Mo. App 749, 199 S.W.2d 421
(1947).
16 RESTATENNT OF TORTS § 942 (1936). See also 43 U. CoLo. L. REV. 225, 233
(1971) which defined "public interest" as "the effect of granting an injunction upon
persons or groups of persons other than the parties to the action."
1' Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 226 S.W.2d 614
(1950).
An injunction was denied where a business investment was $5,500,000, pay-
ments to other local businesses amounted to $1,030,000 yearly, taxes contributed
to the community were $130,000, and, one thousand employees and their depen-
dents relied upon the operations of the plant. Koseris v. J.R. Simplot Co., 82 Idaho
263, 352 P.2d 235 (1960). This example clearly shows the impact an injunction could
have upon the public interest. See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 942, comment b,
c (1936).
I Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 811, 12 S.E. 1085,
1087 (1891).
-' Ritz v. Woman's Club, 114 W. Va. 675, 678, 173 S.E. 564, 565 (1934).
10
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festly unfair to require the plaintiffs to bear the nuisance merely
because the public might benefit indirectly." In other jurisdictions
this factor is often so compelling that some routinely state they will
consider "the injury which may result to the defendant and the
public" if the injunction is granted, as well as the injury sustained
by the plaintiff if the injunction is denied." This one-sided ap-
proach is a frequent criticism of the comparative injury doctrine.2
The criticism is justified in cases where the business interferes with
civic beauty, fire prevention, or the public health, and the com-
munity purpose would be furthered by granting the injunction; yet
the injunction is denied! 3 Rarely is the public interest stated as a
reason for granting the injunction. However, in Elm Grove Mining
Co., the court helped the private landowner close the mine by
weighing the damage to public health on the side of the landowner,
and further stating that no measure of public benefit will protect
the nuisance if it interferes with the public health. 4 Notwithstand-
ing this case, the public interest is a significant factor in the denial
of many injunctions." Unfortunately, it does not greatly support
parties seeking relief from unpleasant nuisances.!
Another common factor in the balancing process is a compari-
son of the economic impact an injunction would have upon a busi-
ness if granted, as opposed to the economic impact upon the com-
plaining party if denied. This comparison is so basic to a balancing
determination that at least one court has looked solely to economic
impact to justify denial of the injunction. 7 This process of balanc-
ing economic effects has been labeled the doctrine of "disparity of
economic consequences." More particularly described, the doc-
trine states that economic consequences to the business owner and
the public are compared to the damage to the complaining prop-
60 Id. at 678, 173 S.E. at 565.
'I E.g., Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 514, 226 S.W.2d
615, 619 (1950).
62 E.g., Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d 692, 698 (W. Va. 1974).
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 942, comment c (1936).
, 122 W. Va. at 452, 9 S.E.2d at 817.
E.g., Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Riter
v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). See the cases
collected in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 601 (1971).
68 But see Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1974); Board of Comm'rs
v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 122 W. Va. 442, 9 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
11 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
60 Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d 692, 698 (W. Va. 1974).
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erty owners. 9 Whether the doctrine is merely a factor in the bal-
ancing process or sufficiently independent to justify the denial or
grant of an injunction is arguable. At least one commentator con-
tends the majority rule is that no injunction will lie in a nuisance
case if the resultant economic hardship to the defendant greatly
outweighs the economic benefits the plaintiff will realize by having
the nuisance enjoined." Whatever the merits of the argument, the
better position is that economic disparity is one of many factors
considered in balancing the comparative hardships.71
There is little case law in West Virginia regarding the role
economic disparity plays in the balancing equation. In one case,
the court actually stated that the closing of a business would be
costly because it employed sixty people and would cost thirty thou-
sand dollars to move.72 Based upon this factor, the injunction was
denied. The court recently addressed itself to the role of economic
disparity without resolving the question. In Mahoney v. Walter73
an automobile salvage yard was located in a predominantly resi-
dential community that was unzoned. After the lower court had
declared the business a nuisance and granted an injunction, the
defendant appealed, contending that the doctrine of the "balanc-
ing of conveniences" should be applied and the injunction dis-
solved or modified. The court recognized that the "balancing of
hardships" had been in American law for sometime, but cited no
West Virginia authority.74 The court then, however, referred to the
"balancing of conveniences" and equated this to the "disparity of
economic consequences" as applied in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co.7" The court justifiably criticized the disparity rule because
' Id. at 698.
7' 43 U. CoLO. L. Rxv. 225, 228 (1971).
" See, e.g., Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1974); Schlotfelt v.
Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). The primary
reason for confusion in this area is the need to find tangibles to compare. It is
difficult to weigh, for example, fourteen jobs against the inability of the plaintiff
to get a good night's rest because of excessive noise. As a result of this impossible
comparison, a common escape is to compare the economic loss, reducible to dollars
and cents. Such an approach is unwise. As the RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 941,
comment a (1936) indicates, the "balance of convenience" is not the proper test,
because the term suggests a nice measurement of relative advantages and denial
of injunction if the scales tip in the defendant's favor.
11 Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 812, 12 S.E. 1085,
1088 (1891).
; Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1974).
7' Id. at 698.
73 Id.
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some of the harm to the landowner was general and could not be
translated into economic damages. Furthermore, the court in
Mahoney stated that "regardless of the judicial soundness of the
doctrine," there was no public pconomic interest in the business
and the business's only economic interest was its location, and this
was minimal because the business was mobile.7" Obviously, the
court, believing the defendant could readily move his business to
another location, did not think the impact signficant enough to
deny the injunction. What the court would have done had there
been a public economic interest and a business that was not mobile
is still an open question; however, in light of the court's criticism,
it could fairly be concluded that economic impact is one factor
among many to be considered in resolving the issue.77
The Mahoney case placed particular emphasis upon the terms
"location" and "mobility" while recognizing habitation rights as
superior to business rights whenever they conflict in a residential
area. 8 The location of the nuisance is a primary factor in the
balancing scheme, and West Virginia, like many other jurisdic-
tions, will consider this principle.79 Generally, locations are either
residential, commercial, industrial, or a combination of the three.
The Iowa Supreme Court denied injunctive relief when the pollut-
ing industry was located in a heavy industrial district that never
had been anything but a heavy industrial district occupied by such
industries as sawmills, planing mills, a quarry, a packing house,
and a weed killer factory."0 Against this background, the court
properly considered the location and granted damages, rather than
injunctive relief, to the injured property owners. The courts have
76 Id.
n The court, after criticizing the "disparity of economic consequences," con-
fuses the issue further by stating near the end of the opinion:
Although it was not mentioned in the trial court's memorandum opinion,
it must be assumed that it considered the effect on the defendants' busi-
ness and the economic effect on his private affairs and compared them
to the present and prospective harm to the defendants [plaintiffs?] in
the event the injunction was denied.
205 S.E.2d at 700. Does this mean that trial courts should consider this aspect in
the future? The answer is difficult to determine. Perhaps more light could have
been cast on the matter had the court cited some West Virginia authority for its
propositions.
18 Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d 692, 698 (W. Va. 1974).
" E.g., Roy v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co., 262 Mich. 663, 247 N.W. 774 (1933);
York v. Stallings 217 Ore. 13, 341 P.2d 529 (1959).
P0 Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 722, 82 N.W.2d 151, 158
(1957).
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also applied the locality factor in favor of the defendant. The rea-
son for such equal treatment stems from the concrete determina-
tions possible from a view of every location. Demonstrative of this
even-handed application is another Iowa decision, in which the
court said that a plaintiff who found his clean and quiet residential
neighborhood invaded by a business enterprise that caused loud
noises and polluted the air with dust and other matters had the
equities all on his side.' These two decisions support the soundness
of a direct application of the locality factor. Another aspect of the
location factor is the mobility of the business. Clearly, a coal mine
operates where the coal is located or it does not operate. On the
other hand, an automobile salvage yard is highly mobile. To ignore
these principles, as some courts have done, 2 and to decide the
justness of any given private nuisance action solely on the "dispar-
ity of economic consequences" is to distort the basic concepts of
equity.
In addition to balancing the hardships in a private nuisance
action in which injunctive relief is sought, most courts will balance
the equities of the various parties involved. When this balancing
of equities is utilized, it is limited, unlike the balancing of hard-
ships, to the conduct of the parties actually before the court.
Among the elements involved in the balancing of equities is the
bad faith or misconduct of each party."4 Bad faith properly involves
the issue of "coming to a nuisance." The majority of courts will
consider the equities involved in a case where the plaintiff "comes
to a nuisance," but this factor alone will not prevent injunctive
a' Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 1111, 109 N.W.2d
695, 699 (1961).
92 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
'1 There is a difference between the "balancing of equities" and the "balancing
of hardships." The "balance of hardships" properly involves those aspects hereto-
fore discussed. On the other hand, "balancing of equities" has nothing to do with
injuries, but concerns misconduct, bad faith, or unclean hands. The "balancing of
equities" is not a factor to be considered in the comparative injury process, but is
a collateral concept that may artificially affect an otherwise appropriate injunction.
RESTATEM.NT OF ToRTs § 940, comment b (1936) gives an example where a specula-
tor buys land, knowing it to be a dumping ground for debris from a mine, primarily
in order to use the threat of an injunction against dumping to coerce purchase by
the mine owner at an extortionate price. Whatever the merits of the "balancing of
hardships," the injunction will be denied because of the plaintiff's misconduct.
Courts have consistently confused these two concepts. E.g., Gunther v. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 157 F. Supp. 25, 33 (N.D.W. Va. 1957).
" D. DoBBs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Ra Dims § 5.7, at 359 (1973).
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relief from being granted by the court. 5 Evidently no West Virginia
case has decided whether "coming to a nuisance" is a proper con-
sideration in balancing the equities, but at least one case has rec-
ognized that if one does come to a nuisance, it does not prevent
him from bringing legal proceedings to recover damages." Addi-
tionally, misleading conduct is somewhat different than "coming
to a nuisance" in that the complaining party stands by silently
while a nuisance is being created." If the plaintiff acquiesces in a
nuisance, he will in most instances be estopped from asserting the
nuisance.u In such a case, injunctive relief will usually be denied8
because of laches or estoppel, but again the extent of the acquiesc-
ence must be looked at in the perspective of the entire problem."
Misconduct of the parties is another aspect of balancing of
equities that courts must be careful not to overlook. In fact, if the
misconduct is wilful or wanton, the injunction will be granted
notwithstanding the outcome of the balance of hardships or harm
to the defendant. The courts in these cases reason that a wrongdoer
will not be entitled to the benefit of any consideration in a court
of equity.8 In essence, the balancing of equities is something dis-
tinctly different from the comparative injury doctrine. The fact not
to lose sight of in these cases is that there is an interaction between
conflicting interests, and courts that balance both the hardships
and equities have a better opportunity to reach a sound decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The comparative injury doctrine has been both praised and
criticized; nonetheless it is now a definite part of the law, adhered
to by the majority of jurisdictions. The exact mechanics of the
application of the rule are not yet distinct, but each jurisdiction
that applies the doctrine looks upon numerous factors in each ap-
91 Dolata v. Berthelet Fuel & Supply Co., 254 Wis. 194, 201, 36 N.W.2d 97, 100
(1949). See also Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn 374, 173 N.W.
805 (1919), wherein the court indicated that "no great weight should be given to
the fact that a person complaining of a nuisance came to it."
Richards v. Ohio River R.R., 56 W. Va. 592, 593, 49 S.E. 385, 386 (1904).
D. DoBs, supra note 84, § 5.7, at 359.
Crawford v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 62 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933).
" See Brokaw v. Carson, 74 W. Va. 340, 81 S.E. 1133 (1914).
'3 D. DOBBS, supra note 84, § 5.7, at 360.
" Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 141 W. Va. 627, 652-53, 92 S.E.2d
891, 905 (1956); Moyerman v. Glanzberg, 391 Pa. 387, 393, 138 A.2d 681, 685 (1958).
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plication of the rule. The best overall statement respecting the
factors involved is probably that each case must be determined
upon its own particular facts.2 Confusion still exists regarding the
"disparity of economic consequences," especially in West Virginia
since the Mahoney case, but neat, fine lines have never been a
characteristic of nuisance law. However, two principles in West
Virginia are abundantly clear: (1) no one is entitled to injunctive
relief as a matter of right; and (2) when private interest conflict
with business interests, the hardships and the equities will be bal-
anced, but the particular facts and businesses involved will dictate
how the balance is to be interpreted. 3
Gerard R. Stowers
9 Martin v. Williams, 141 W. Va. 595, 612, 93 S.E.2d 835, 845 (1956).
13 Compare Severt v. Beckley Coals, Inc., 153 W. Va. 600, 170 S.E.2d 577
(1969), with Martin v. Williams, 141 W. Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835 (1956).
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